Stephen Greenspan on "Why DSM5 suggested a switch from adaptive behavior to adaptive reasoning": APA Div 33 featured conversation

 

My long time friend and professional colleague Dr. Stephen Greenspan, is conducting a featured conversation hour for Division 33 at the forthcoming APA convention in Denver.  He has provided me an advanced copy of his outline and has graciously given me permission to make it available at the ICDP blog.  A copy can be obtained by clicking here.

Stephen is one of the great "thinkers" in the field of intellectual disabilities.  Our professional lives crossed long distance when I was a doctoral student.  My advisor, Dr. Robert Bruininks, put me in charge of a series of studies investigating the constructs of adaptive and maladaptive behavior.  These studies eventually led to my dissertation--which was a CFA validation study of Greenspan's Model of Personal Competence (see 1990 reference below).  To the best of my knowledge, this was the first published article validating Greenspan's model.

Below are links to the various articles (I simply grabbed them from my MindHub web page--please visit if you want additional information).  Consistent with Stephen's outline notes, in this validated model of personal competence, conceptual intelligence was operationalized as measured by intelligence tests, and was not considered a domain of adaptive behavior.

Of interest is the recent study by MaCann et al. that provides structural (CFA) evidence for a separate cognitively oriented social-emotional construct, distinct from the other cognitive domains in the CHC taxonomy of human intelligence.  Although MaCann et al. refer to the construct as emotional intelligence, a reading of the dimensions suggest it could easily be called social intelligence.  

Finally, as Bruininks and I were pulled away from our AB/PC program of research for different reasons, I continue to be perplexed why other researchers have not tried to extend and refine the research on the model of personal competence, particularly given its prominence (and disagreements) in definitions of ID.

Adaptive Behavior and Personal Competence Research (select articles)

• Thompson, J. R., McGrew, K. S., & Bruininks, R. H. (2002).  Pieces of the puzzle. Measuring the personal competence and support needs of persons with intellectual disabilities. Peabody Journal of Education, 77(2), 23-29.
• Thompson, J., McGrew, K. & Bruininks, R. (1999).  Adaptive and maladaptive behavior.  Functional and structural characteristics.  In R. L. Schalock & D Braddock (Eds), Adaptive behavior and its measurement: Implications for the field of mental retardation(pp. 15-42).  Washington, DC.  American Association on Mental Retardation.
• Widaman, K. & McGrew K., (1996).  The structure of adaptive behavior.  In J.W. Jacobson & J.A. Mulick (Eds.), Manual of diagnosis and professional practice in mental retardation (pp. 97-110).  Washington, D.C.  American Psychological Association.
• McGrew, K., Bruininks, R., & Johnson, D. (1997).  Confirmatory factor analysis investigation of Greenspan's model of personal competence.  American Journal on Mental Retardation, 100(5) 533-545.
• Greenspan, S., & McGrew, K. (1996).  Response to Mathias and Nettlebeck on the structure of competence.  Need for theory-based methods to test theory-based questions.  Research in Developmental Disabilities, 17, 145-152.
• Bruininks, R., Chen, T., Lakin, C., & McGrew, K. (1992).  Components of personal competence and community integration for persons with mental retardation in small residential programs. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 13, 463-479.
• Ittenbach, R., Spiegel, A., McGrew, K., & Bruininks, R.  (1992). A confirmatory factor analysis of early childhood ability measures within a model of personal competence.  Journal of School Psychology, 30, 307-323.
• McGrew, K., Bruininks, R., & Thurlow, M. (1992). Relationship between measures of adaptive functioning and community adjustment for adults with mental retardation. Exceptional Children, 58, 517-529.
• McGrew, K., Ittenbach, R., Bruininks, R., & Hill, B. (1991). Factor structure of maladaptive behavior across the lifespan for persons with mental retardation. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 12, 181-199.
• McGrew, K., & Bruininks, R. (1990).  Defining adaptive and maladaptive behavior within a model of personal competence. School Psychology Review, 19, 53-73.
• McGrew, K., & Bruininks, R. (1989).  The factor structure of adaptive behavior. School Psychology Review, l8, 64-8l.
• Bruininks, R., McGrew, K., & Maruyama, G. (1988).  Structure of adaptive behavior in samples with and without mental retardation.  American Journal on Mental Retardation, 95(3), 265-272.

Researh Byte: Lower social intelligence results in greater brain network activity---when on is not socially confident, ones brain works harder

Contributions of self-report and performance-based individual differences measures of social cognitive ability to large-scale neural network functioning

• Ryan Smith 
• , Anna Alkozei
• , William D. S. Killgore

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Abstract

Adaptive social behavior appears to require flexible interaction between multiple large-scale brain networks, including the executive control network (ECN), the default mode network (DMN), and the salience network (SN), as well as interactions with the perceptual processing systems these networks function to modulate. Highly connected cortical “hub” regions are also thought to facilitate interactions between these networks, including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and anterior insula (AI). However, less is presently known about the relationship between these network functions and individual differences in social-cognitive abilities. In the present study, 23 healthy adults (12 female) underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while performing a visually based social judgment task (requiring the evaluation of social dominance in faces). Participants also completed both self-report and performance-based measures of emotional intelligence (EI), as well as measures of personality and facial perception ability. During scanning, social judgment, relative to a control condition involving simple perceptual judgment of facial features in the same stimuli, activated hub regions associated with each of the networks mentioned above (observed clusters included: bilateral DLPFC, DMPFC/ACC, AI, and ventral visual cortex). Interestingly, self-reported and performance-based measures of social-cognitive ability showed opposing associations with these patterns of activation. Specifically, lower self-reported EI and lower openness in personality both independently predicted greater activation within hub regions of the SN, DMN, and ECN (i.e., the DLPFC, DMPFC/ACC, and AI clusters); in contrast, in the same analyses greater scores on performance-based EI measures and on facial perception tasks independently predicted greater activation within hub regions of the SN and ECN (the DLPFC and AI clusters), and also in the ventral visual cortex. These findings suggest that lower confidence in one’s own social-cognitive abilities may promote the allocation of greater cognitive resources to, and improve the performance of, social-cognitive functions.

Keywords

Social Cognition Large-Scale Neural Networks Individual Differences Emotional Intelligence Social Visual Perception

Personal (hot vs cool) intelligence: Real? Can we measure?

Interesting article that purports to demonstrate the validity of the construct of "personal intelligence" and the ability to measure it. I find this intuitively attractive and interesting, but I am not yet convinced. The long search for measures of social intelligence constantly bumped up against the problem of discriminant validity. That is, when measures of SI are analyzed with cognitive (cool) measures of intelligence, SI measures were typically found to be highly correlated with verbal or general intelligence...and thus did not show evidence that SI measures were tapping anything beyond cognitive abilities.

In this article, which reports multiple studies, only one single test of vocabulary was included in one study. One measure of vocabulary in one of the studies is not sufficient. The proposed measure of PI needs to be administered together with a broad measure of diverse cognitive abilities in order to show that it measures something different from cognitive abilities.

Interesting.......hopeful.....but I need more and better discriminant validity evidence.

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Social face cognition abilities: Where do they fit in the CHC model?

Very thought provoking research suggesting that the taxonomy of human cognitive abilities (i.e., CHC theory) may need to figure out where to fit abilities from the domain of social face cognition.

A nice piece of interesting research by Wilhelm et al. (2010), presented in the new IQs Readings format

Enjoy.

intelligence IQ tests IQ scores CHC theory Cattell-Horn-Carroll human cognitive abilities psychology school psychology individual differences cognitive psychology neuropsychology special education educational psychology psychometrics psychological assessment psychological measurement IQs Corner face recognition face cognition social intelligence social awareness

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iPost: Are you a high IQ "clever-silly"

Woodley, M. A. (2010). Are high-IQ individuals deficient in common sense? A critical examination of the 'clever sillies' hypothesis. Intelligence, 38(5), 471-480.

Abstract

A controversial hypothesis [Charlton (2009). Clever sillies: Why high-IQ people tend to be deficient in common sense. Medical Hypotheses, 73, 867–870] has recently been proposed to account for why individuals of high-IQ and high social status tend to hold counter-intuitive views on social phenomena. It is claimed that these ‘clever sillies’ use their high general intelligence and Openness to Experience to overanalyze social problems for which socially intelligent/common sense responses would seemingly be more appropriate. The first three sections of this review will consider i) the relationship between general and social intelligence; ii) the role of situational effects on the direction of the correlation between IQ and political attitudes; iii) the behavioral ecology of competitive altruism. While there is no hard evidence for Charlton's hypothesis, sophisticated although ultimately non-rational subjective analyses of social phenomena (i.e. ones that are disconfirmed by data, or reject empiricism) do seem to be favored by individuals in certain high-IQ knowledge work sectors. It is suggested that these function as costly signals of altruism, and that their popularity can best be understood in light of the theory that social attitudes are fundamentally influenced by perceptions of dominance and counter-dominance, with the latter playing an especially significant role in influencing the values systems of contemporary societies where the degree of conspicuous inequality is significantly evolutionarily novel.

clever-sillies high IQ intelligence gifted Social intelligence

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Can frontal brain age-related atrophy increase gambling, depression and prejudice?

Another nice research summary in one of my favorite journals for quick contemporary research updates....Current Directions in Psychological Science. von Hippel (2007) presents a summary that suggests that age-related atrophy of the brains frontal lobes (which is the primary seat of executive functions), which can produce increased disinhibition in behavior, might be causative variables in increased prejudice, gambling, and depression in the elderly.


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Beyond IQ Byte # 2- Educational implications of ability conception research

Completing my trilogy on the conative construct of ability conception (click here and here for prior posts), below are some of the major educational implications from the ability conception research literature. Most of this information is drawn from Dweck [Dweck, C. S. (2002). The development of ability conceptions, In A. Wigfield, & J.S. Eccles (Eds.), Development of achievement motivation (pp. 57-91). San Diego: Academic Press. - click here for more information on this excellent book), with minor augmentations from Kaplan and Midgley (1997) and Perkins et al. (2000).

• All children, regardless of age, have an easier time making effort than ability inferences

• Although it was once thought that the ability conceptions of preschool and kindergarten children were relatively immune to the effects of learning failure, recent research “has shown that a sizable proportion of these young children show clear signs of impairment when they encounter a series of salient, visible failures (such as jigsaw puzzles they cannot complete) or when they meet with criticism for their performance”. However, when compared to older students (ages seven and above), the failure experience during the preschool years must be particularly obvious and powerful in order to exert a long-term impact on motivation via academic ability conception formation. Young children may draw ability inferences, but do not typically see future outcomes as being constrained by them. Buffering young children, particularly those at risk for significant and powerful early learning failure experiences (e.g., students with disabilities), would appear to be an important educational goal.

• When students are at an approximate seven-to-eight year level of developmental functioning, significant changes in ability conception occur. It has been suggested that increased reasoning ability, around ages to 7-8, contributes to children giving greater weights to ability information than personal motivation. The student’s conception of ability now becomes more distinguised from social-moral qualities and becomes defined more as an internal quality, more consistent with external sources (adults), and is the result of greater self-criticism and social normative comparisons. It is during the seven-to- eight year developmental period that students become more concerned about their abilities, especially in response to negative feedback and evaluation (normative feedback information has more impact).

• After ability conceptions begin to crystallize (after the 7-8 year period), ability conceptions start to exert a greater impact on academic performance. This increased coalescence of ability conceptions is believed to be due to ever increasing reasoning skills, which, in turn, results in children becoming more accurate in thinking about the relations between their abilities, effert, and performance. Students may not be able to verbalize their ability conception, but it is believed that students now can separaate ability as a factor separate from effort.

• Two general ability conceptions emerge at approximately the seven-to-eight year developmental level and become crystallized at approximately the ten-to-twelve year level. The least adaptive ability conception is a “trait-oriented system” (entity view of ability) where students view their abilities as relatively fixed internal quantities. Learners with an entity view are more likely to anchor their conceptions of ability in broad abilities or capacity, constructs that are more fixed than motivation and knowledge. When encountering academic failure, it is hypothesized that a trait academic ability conception increases the chances that the student will view themselves as deficient on a stable inherent characteristic and, thus, they will anticipate and predict future failure. Since the trait is fixed, there is a self-belief that it cannot be changed via effort. The result can be a decrease in academic and intrinsic motivation, the devaluation of effort, and the interpretation of academic outcomes as reflecting on an internal personal trait. In contrast, a process-oriented system (incremental view of ability) conception is more adaptive as it focuses on the view that ability can be developed and that effort and strategies are important for success. Learners holding an incremental view are significantly more likely to include the constructs of knowledge and motivation in their personal descriptions of their abilities, constructs that are typically viewed as more malleable (less fixed). The process-oriented ability conception is postulated to be more adaptive as the student sees room for improvement in personal ability via effort and work. Furthermore, an individual holding an incremental view of ability tends to focus on learning and is likely to be inclined to analyze a challenging situation and employ a variety of strategies to get around an obstacle. An incremental or process view is associated with higher levels of intrinsic motivation and academic self-efficacy. In general, entity “holders” prefer performance goals over mastery or learning goals, and vice versa. Entity learners tend to be more affected by comparisons to others (normative performance comparison information; e.g., grades).

• Of particular relevance to students with learning problems, particulary after an individuals ability conception is at the more crystallized stages, is the finding that when students are low in skills and abilities (in a social normative comparison sense), there is an increased probability of effort-avoidance. An individual who is low in academic skills and abilities, and who also holds an entity or trait view of ability (a view that fosters the belief that effort or motivation is not helpful), is hypothesized to view any attempt at increasing effort as risky. Increased effort that results in failure can only reinforce the belief that "I'm dumb." The power of failure to impair academic performance increases via a decrease in intrinsic motivation.

• Social normative grading and evaluation systems tend to foster the more vulnerable and maladaptive view of academic ability as a fixed trait. In addition, students with an entity view of academic abilities tend to choose the less desirable academic performance goal orientation rather than a learning goal orientation (which is associated with the incremental view of abilities). Entity-oriented students also tend to attribute their failure (locus of control) more to ability rather than effort. The ability conception research suggests that educational environments that place a greater relative value on changes in skills and knowledge (vs. an emphasis on relative standing in a group) may influence the development of the more adaptive and positive incremental/process view of academic abilities.

• Research has suggested that friendships which, in part, are formed based on perceived psychological similarity in academic competence, exert a modest influence on the adoption of academic and ability self-competence beliefs.

Emotional intelligence (EQ) - a valid construct?

Emotional IQ (EQ). To say the least, this construct enjoys considerable popularity in the popular press. But.....from a psychometric perspective.....is EQ real?.......does it represent a valid domain of human abilities? Curious minds want to know.

As I've noted on a number of occassions, I find Current Directions in Psychological Science a must read for scholars looking for a brief, contemporary “taking stock” summary of a specific area of psychological research. That being said, in one of the most recent issues, Salovey and Grewal (2005; click here to read/view aricle) suggest that the accumulating evidence positively supports the notion of EQ, particulary the the four-branch model of Mayer and Salovey [Blogmaster note.....reader beware. This review article is coauthered by one of the individuls who has articulated the four-branch model that serves as the basis for the review].

So...if you want the positive spin on EQ, this is a good review.

I myself, being of strong psychometric heritage, particulary of the midwest "dust-bowl empiricism" variety, have formed a somewhat less optimistic conclusion re: the validity of this construct, primary from my readings of other quantoids of similar persuasion. Thus, to provide some balance to the Salovey and Grewal (2005) review, below are select comments from a review article published by Stankov (2000). This, in turn, is followed by an interesting study by Zeidner, Shani-Zinovicha, Matthews Roberts, R. (2006) that was recently published in the journal Intelligence (click here to read/view). [Blogmaster note - it may be important to note that the fourth author on this paper, Richard Roberts, is a long-time colleague and associate of Stankov. The blogmaster considers Stankov and Roberts to be top-notch psychometrically-oriented researchers.]

Readers who are trying to evaluate both sides of the EQ coin should balance the positive review of Salovey and Grewal with a reading of the less optimistic perspectives of Stankov (2000) and Zeidner et al. I recommend reading the introductory literature review in the Zeidner et al. paper for a nice synopsis of the perceived state-of-the-art of the empirical EQ research.

If someone wants to dig deeper into the literature, click here for a search I just completed in the IAP Reference database --- using the keyword "emotional intelligence." There clearly is a large body of contemporary research on the topic of EQ...much more than can be summarized on this humble blog.

Select comments from Stankov, L. (2000), Structural extensions of a hierarchical view on human cognitive abilities. Learning and Individual Differences, 12(1), 35-51.

• "There is currently considerable popular interest in the construct of emotional intelligence. This is particularly pronounced within the business community and to some extent within the educational sphere. Much of this interest is built on a nonscientific and premature acceptance. emotional intelligence is a catchy, but quite inappropriate label. Since much of the writing on this topic also ignores significant previous work on emotionality carried out within the domain of personality, it is hard to shrug off the conclusion that scientific respectability is the goal yet to be attained by this area of psychology."

• "However, it is still unclear whether these new measures define factors that ate distinct from the primary abilities of Gc and, indeed, from well-established personality traits."

• "Although much research in Emotional intelligence is without substance, it is possible that existing enthusiasm will lead to some useful outcomes in the measurement of emotionality in the future. However, in the absence of a demonstration that whatever is measured by the alleged tests of emotionality is indeed akin to intelligence, it would be more appropriate to talk about "emotional awareness," "emotional competence" or "emotion perception" rather than "emotional intelligence" in the future. The removal of "intelligence" from the title is likely to lead to a dissipation of much of the current enthusiasm. In reality, this may benefit serious workers in the field."

Select comments from Zeidner et al. (2005)

• "Thus far, we have assumed that the MSCEIT does indeed assess genuine abilities (Mayer et al., 2000). However, as we have discussed elsewhere at length (Matthews et al., 2002), it is unclear exactly what is measured by tests of this kind, and despite good agreement of different scoring methods in a recent study (Mayer et al., 2003), doubts remain about whether scoring is veridical (Roberts et al., 2001). One possibility is that the MSCEIT assesses general declarative knowledge about emotions, of the kind that might be obtained from a school or university psychology course, such as hopelessness being a cause of depression: i.e., explicit, rather than implicit, knowledge. If so, the present results may reflect gifted children’s overall advantage in general knowledge, rather than any special facility in understanding and managing emotion. Academic knowledge of the causes of depression, for example, does not necessarily translate into procedural skills for alleviating depression in self and others. Future research might usefully investigate the extent to which gifted children are able to benefit from whatever capabilities are assessed by the MSCEIT in academic and interpersonal settings."

• "Another possibility (Matthews et al., 2002), linked to the use of consensus scoring, is that the MEIS and MSCEIT assess a kind of cultural conformity, i.e., holding beliefs about emotion that are congruent with cultural norms. Such "goodness of fit" might well be adaptive, but it does not represent a personal ability or aptitude."

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