Thinking..fast and slow: Dual process models of cognition/intelligence--hot topic

Dual cognitive process (sometimes called Type I/II processing) have increased in prominence the past five years.  Within the past few weeks the long anticipated book "Thinking, Fast and Slow" by Daniel Kaneham was released, and it is already near the top of most non-fiction best selling books.  I can't wait to get my copy, as it will put Malcom Gladwell's "Blink" in it's proper place.  This will give the layperson, and many professionals, a better understanding of these two general classes of cognitive processes.

My thinking about applied intelligence test development and interpretation has been incorporated this general dichotomy in the form of a working (evolving) test development/interpretation framework (see summary figure below).

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The most recent journal to devote a special issue to dual process models is Developmental Review.  Below are the key articles and a few intriguing model figures.

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Beyond CHC: Pushing the edge of the CHC and WJ III envelope

This is a revision of a prior post (which I have now deleted).  I previously posted an online presentation (at SlideShare) summarizing a series of recent analysis I completed. The analysis are grounded in a variety of exploratory data analysis I  conducted over the past nine years, which when combined with recent theoretical literature, resulted in my attempt to search for possible modifications and extensions to CHC model of intelligence, as operationally defined by the WJ III test battery.

The original SlideShare  file (and associated PDF copies) did not include the alternative WJ III measurement model that was the basis of the alternative CHC theoretical models presented. The current version now includes the alternative WJ III measurement model.

The show can be viewed by clicking here [NOTE----SlideShare is experiencing problems today and I can't access the site to see if the new sets of slides uploaded correctly.  Be patient and come back and try again if you get an error message].   Alternatively, clicking here provides access to a PDF copy of the complete set of slides for immediate viewing or download.  Clicking here provides access to a "brief" copy of the key conclusion slides (in PDF format)

The underlying measurement model presented requires an understanding of the task demands and abilities measured by the various Woodcock Johnson III tests. For readers unfamiliar with the names, test descriptions, and abilities measured, it is recommended that you first become familiar with the tests by reviewing a document available here. 

Below are the key summary slides from the brief PDF file. I am assuming that the reader is familiar with the WJ III tests and can recognize the implications of some of the new alternative interpretations for select CHC factors and WJ III tests. I have inserted some background slides that should help readers understand the idea behind some of the proposed alternative CHC theory models.

In this post I want to focus on the WJ III measurement model suggested.  I  draw attention to two of the WJ measurement model slides (see below) as I believe they contain potentially important new insights into possible CHC factors and supplemental interpretation material for select WJ III tests.

The first measurement slide suggests that broad Gs (processing speed) may subsume a number of domain-specific processing speed abilities differentiated by stimulus content. I believe the four different speeded factors might best be interpreted as fluency factors as not all the test indicators are performed against a time constraint; but fluency and efficiency of performance may be the key to understanding the commonality of the tests loading on the domain specific speeded or fluency factors (e.g., the loading of the Calculation test on the obvious quantitative or numerical fluency factor). Of the four hypothesized cognitive speed/ fluency factors (numerical or quantitative fluency, reading and writing fluency, visual processing fluency, and fluency of Gc abilities), I am most intrigued by the latter. I hypothesize that the common feature of the Gs(Gc) factor tests is speed of lexical access (how quickly and efficiently one can access ones lexicon), which is similar to the concept of rapid automatic naming (RAN).

The next slide also suggests some very interesting hypotheses regarding the nature of Gf (fluid intelligence) and complex working memory. As can be seen in the slide, two different fluid intelligence factors were suggested. One clearly represents quantitative reasoning (RQ). The other, which I current label Gf* in the figure, is very intriguing. Ever since the WJ III was published I have run a variety of exploratory data analysis (some of which are summarized in the slide show available through the online PPT SlideShare show). A robust finding across all analyses has been the constant association of the Sound Awareness and Understanding Directions tests on a single Gf factor. The current model  suggests that these two tests, which require little in the way of inductive or deductive reasoning or "thinking", most likely tap complex language-based working memory ability. When combined with the other tests that load on Gf*, the hypothesis is presented that in addition to a quantitative reasoning Gf factor, there may be a second (and more broad) Gf factor that deals with cognitive complexity both in terms of inductive and deductive reasoning demands and heavy demands placed upon a person's complex working memory resources. This is an intriguing finding consistent with the extant research literature that consistently suggests a strong relation between fluid intelligence and complex working memory.

I could go on and on and on and speculate for days.  Instead, I would prefer that those interested in discussing these findings do so via the CHC listserv and/or join IQs Corner at Facebook (click on IQs Corner Facebook badge at top of this blog) and start a discussion thread.

The results, interpretations, and opinions presented in the above described material reflect the opinions and interpretations of Kevin McGrew, a co-author of the WJ III battery [conflict of information disclosure]. The information does not necessarily represent the opinions of the other WJ III co-authors or the publisher of the WJ III.

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Dual-processing models of cognitive/intellectual performance

Dual processing models of cognitive ability have been prevalent in the psychology literature for decades. During the past decade the two different modes of cognitive processing have been referred to as System I and System II. I've always found the dual-system theories of significant interest, but I had a difficult time making sense of a variety of different dual system models and theories.

Thus, I was extremely excited to recently run across a Annual Review of Psychology article on the topic of dual-processing cognitive models by Jonathan Evans (2008).  Below are the highlights of the Evans article together with select summary tables that are excellent sources for integrating the various due process models (the following abstracted statements are from the review-emphasis to Evans statements, as added by the blog master, are designated by italics and/or underlining.).  I particularly like Evans recommendation to refer to these two types of processing as type I and type II and the critical distinction between the involvement of complex working memory. 

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• Close inspection of the evidence suggests that generic dual-system theory is currently oversimplified and misleading

• We might be better off talking about type 1 and type 2 processes since all theories seem to contrast fast, automatic, or unconscious processes with those that are slow, effortful, and conscious (Samuels 2006). Such terminology does not commit use to a two-system view. However, it would then be helpful to have some clear basis for this distinction

• My suggestion is that type 2 processes are those that require access to a single, capacity-limited central working memory resource, while type 1 processes do not require such access. This implies that the core features of type 2 processes are that they are slow, sequential, and capacity limited. The last feature implies also that their functioning will correlate with individual differences in cognitive capacity and be disrupted by concurrent working memory load. Depending upon what else is assumed about working memory, there may be a rationale for describing such type 2 processes as registering in consciousness and having properties associated with executive processes and intentional, higher-order control.

• If there are indeed multiple kinds of type 1 processes, then it is to be expected that psychologists will have developed different kinds of dual-process theories, which seems to be the case.

• The problem with this distinction is that type 1 processes then simply refer to any processes in the mind that can operate automatically without occupying working memory space. As already indicated, there are a number of different kinds of such implicit processes.

• In short, my conclusion is that although dual-process theories enjoy good empirical support in a number of fields of psychology, the superficially attractive notion that they are all related to the same underlying two systems of cognition is probably mistaken, at least in the way that Systems 1 and 2 are being defined in the current literatures.

• It is perfectly possible that one system operates entirely with type 1 processes and that the other includes a mixture of type 1 and type 2 processes, the latter being linked to the use of working memory, which this system uses—among other resources. Such a proposal could resolve the conflict between evidence for dual systems on the one hand with the proposals of different dual-process theorists on the other.