The use of the Woodcock-Johnson Fourth Edition (WJ IV) GIA Cognitive IQ score in intellectual disability (ID) determination

The WJ IV Cognitive GIA in iintellectual disability (ID) assessment from Kevin McGrew

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rules (Black v Carpenter, 2017) against norm obsolescence (Flynn effect) adjustment of IQ scores in Atkins death penalty cases

A newly published 6th Circuit opinion (Black v Carpenter, 2017) rules against norm obsolescence (the Flynn effect) in the evaluation of IQ test scores in Atkins ID death penalty cases.  I obviously disagree with this decision as outlined in my 2015 chapter in the AAIDD "The Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability" (Polloway, 2015).

I have no further comment at this time as my expert opinion is clearly articulated in the AAIDD publication and I will continue my efforts to educate the courts.  This decision is at variance with the official positions of American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) and the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-5), the two professional associations with official  guidance regarding  the diagnosis of ID. 

This looks like another issue that might need the attention of SCOTUS.

The following section is extracted from the complete ruling.


E. Implications of the Flynn Effect

There is good reason to have pause before retroactively adjusting IQ scores downward to offset the Flynn Effect. As we noted above, see n.1, supra, the Flynn Effect describes the apparent rise in IQ scores generated by a given IQ test as time elapses from the date of that specific test’s standardization. The reported increase is an average of approximately three points per decade, meaning that for an IQ test normed in 1995, an individual who took that test in 1995 and scored 100 would be expected to score 103 on that same test if taken in 2005, and would be expected to score 106 on that same test in 2015. This does not imply that the individual is “gaining intelligence”: after all, if the same individual, in 2015, took an IQ test that was normed in 2015, we would expect him to score 100, and we would consider him to be of the same “average” intelligence that he demonstrated when he scored 100 on the 1995-normed test in 1995. Rather, the Flynn Effect implies that the longer a test has been on the market after initially being normed, the higher (on average) an individual should perform, as compared with how that individual would perform on a more recently normed IQ test.

At first glance, of course, the Flynn Effect is troubling: if scoring 70 on an IQ test in 1995 would have been sufficient to avoid execution, then why shouldn’t a score of 76 on that same test administered in 2015 (which would produce a “Flynn-adjusted” score of 70) likewise suffice to avoid execution? Further, even if IQ tests were routinely restandardized every year or two to reset the mean score to 100, and even if old IQ tests were taken off the market so as to avoid the Flynn Effect “inflation” of scores that is visible when an IQ test continues to be administered long after its initial standardization, that would only mask, but not change, the fact that IQ scores are said to be rising.

Indeed, perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the Flynn Effect is that it is true. As Dr. Tassé states in his declaration, “[t]he so-called ‘Flynn Effect’ is NOT a theory. It is a wellestablished scientific fact that the US population is gaining an average of 3 full-scale IQ points per decade.” The implications of the Flynn Effect over a longer period of time are jarring: consider a cohort of individuals who, in 1917, took an IQ test that was normed in 1917 and received “normal” scores (say, 100, on average). If we could transport that same cohort of individuals to the present day, we would expect their average score today on an IQ test normed in 2017—a century later—to be thirty points lower: 70, making them mentally retarded, on average.

Alternatively, consider a cohort of individuals who, in 2017, took an IQ test that was normed in 2017 and received “normal” scores (of 100, on average). If we could transport that same cohort of individuals to a century ago, we would expect that their average score on a test normed in 1917 would be thirty points higher: 130, making them geniuses, on average.

It thus makes little sense to use Flynn-adjusted IQ scores to determine whether a criminal is sufficiently intellectually disabled to be exempt from the death penalty. After all, if Atkins stands for the proposition that someone with an IQ score of 70 or lower in 2002 (when Atkins was decided) is exempt from the death penalty, then the use of Flynn-adjusted IQ scores would conceivably lead to the conclusion that, within the next few decades, almost no one with borderline or merely below-average IQ scores should be executed, because their scores when adjusted downward to 2002 levels would be below 70. Indeed, the Supreme Court did not amplify just what moral or medical theory led to the highly general language that it used in Atkins when it prohibited the imposition of a death sentence for criminals who are “so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus,” 536 U.S. at 317. If Atkins had been a 1917 case, the majority of the population now living—if we were to apply downward adjustments to their IQ scores to offset the Flynn Effect from 1917 until now—would be too mentally retarded to be executed; and until the Supreme Court tells us that it is committed to making such downward adjustments, we decline to do so.

* * *

COLE, Chief Judge, concurring in the opinion except for Section II.E. I concur with the majority opinion except as to the section discussing the implications of the Flynn Effect. In holding that Black did not prove that he had significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, we concluded that Black’s childhood IQ scores would be above 70 even if we adjusted those scores to account for both the SEM and the Flynn Effect. Accordingly, I would not address the question of whether we should apply a Flynn Effect adjustment in cases generally because it is unnecessary to the resolution of Black’s appeal. Regardless, courts, including our own in Black I, have regarded the Flynn Effect as an important consideration in determining who qualifies as intellectually disabled. See, e.g., Black v. Bell, 664 F.3d 81, 95–96 (6th Cir. 2011); Walker v. True, 399 F.3d 315, 322–23 (4th Cir. 2005).

Stephen Greenspan on "Why DSM5 suggested a switch from adaptive behavior to adaptive reasoning": APA Div 33 featured conversation

 

My long time friend and professional colleague Dr. Stephen Greenspan, is conducting a featured conversation hour for Division 33 at the forthcoming APA convention in Denver.  He has provided me an advanced copy of his outline and has graciously given me permission to make it available at the ICDP blog.  A copy can be obtained by clicking here.

Stephen is one of the great "thinkers" in the field of intellectual disabilities.  Our professional lives crossed long distance when I was a doctoral student.  My advisor, Dr. Robert Bruininks, put me in charge of a series of studies investigating the constructs of adaptive and maladaptive behavior.  These studies eventually led to my dissertation--which was a CFA validation study of Greenspan's Model of Personal Competence (see 1990 reference below).  To the best of my knowledge, this was the first published article validating Greenspan's model.

Below are links to the various articles (I simply grabbed them from my MindHub web page--please visit if you want additional information).  Consistent with Stephen's outline notes, in this validated model of personal competence, conceptual intelligence was operationalized as measured by intelligence tests, and was not considered a domain of adaptive behavior.

Of interest is the recent study by MaCann et al. that provides structural (CFA) evidence for a separate cognitively oriented social-emotional construct, distinct from the other cognitive domains in the CHC taxonomy of human intelligence.  Although MaCann et al. refer to the construct as emotional intelligence, a reading of the dimensions suggest it could easily be called social intelligence.  

Finally, as Bruininks and I were pulled away from our AB/PC program of research for different reasons, I continue to be perplexed why other researchers have not tried to extend and refine the research on the model of personal competence, particularly given its prominence (and disagreements) in definitions of ID.

Adaptive Behavior and Personal Competence Research (select articles)

• Thompson, J. R., McGrew, K. S., & Bruininks, R. H. (2002).  Pieces of the puzzle. Measuring the personal competence and support needs of persons with intellectual disabilities. Peabody Journal of Education, 77(2), 23-29.
• Thompson, J., McGrew, K. & Bruininks, R. (1999).  Adaptive and maladaptive behavior.  Functional and structural characteristics.  In R. L. Schalock & D Braddock (Eds), Adaptive behavior and its measurement: Implications for the field of mental retardation(pp. 15-42).  Washington, DC.  American Association on Mental Retardation.
• Widaman, K. & McGrew K., (1996).  The structure of adaptive behavior.  In J.W. Jacobson & J.A. Mulick (Eds.), Manual of diagnosis and professional practice in mental retardation (pp. 97-110).  Washington, D.C.  American Psychological Association.
• McGrew, K., Bruininks, R., & Johnson, D. (1997).  Confirmatory factor analysis investigation of Greenspan's model of personal competence.  American Journal on Mental Retardation, 100(5) 533-545.
• Greenspan, S., & McGrew, K. (1996).  Response to Mathias and Nettlebeck on the structure of competence.  Need for theory-based methods to test theory-based questions.  Research in Developmental Disabilities, 17, 145-152.
• Bruininks, R., Chen, T., Lakin, C., & McGrew, K. (1992).  Components of personal competence and community integration for persons with mental retardation in small residential programs. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 13, 463-479.
• Ittenbach, R., Spiegel, A., McGrew, K., & Bruininks, R.  (1992). A confirmatory factor analysis of early childhood ability measures within a model of personal competence.  Journal of School Psychology, 30, 307-323.
• McGrew, K., Bruininks, R., & Thurlow, M. (1992). Relationship between measures of adaptive functioning and community adjustment for adults with mental retardation. Exceptional Children, 58, 517-529.
• McGrew, K., Ittenbach, R., Bruininks, R., & Hill, B. (1991). Factor structure of maladaptive behavior across the lifespan for persons with mental retardation. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 12, 181-199.
• McGrew, K., & Bruininks, R. (1990).  Defining adaptive and maladaptive behavior within a model of personal competence. School Psychology Review, 19, 53-73.
• McGrew, K., & Bruininks, R. (1989).  The factor structure of adaptive behavior. School Psychology Review, l8, 64-8l.
• Bruininks, R., McGrew, K., & Maruyama, G. (1988).  Structure of adaptive behavior in samples with and without mental retardation.  American Journal on Mental Retardation, 95(3), 265-272.

AAIDD "The Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability: A Guide" press release

The staff from AAIDD gave me permission to post a copy of the official AAIDD press release about the new publication on ID and the death penalty (Atkins cases).  A PDF copy of the release can be found here.

AAIDD "Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability" A Guide" is now available at AAIDD website!

The AAIDD ID and death penalty guide is now available at the AAIDD webpage!  Although the title is focused on the death penalty and ID (Atkins cases), having written two of the chapters (Flynn effect; Intellectual functioning), I believe all professionals in the field of psychological, assessment and ID should have this reference book--it presents recommendations for ID practice that go well beyond the official AAIDD classification book (the Green book) and are relevant to ID assessment practices in general.

Description of the guide at the AAIDD webpage.

• In the 2002 landmark decision Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that executing a person with intellectual disability is a violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment,” but left states to determine their own criteria for intellectual disability. AAIDD has always advocated against the death penalty for people with intellectual disability and has long provided amicus curiae briefs in Supreme Court cases. Thus, in this comprehensive new book published by AAIDD, notable authors in the field of intellectual disability discuss all aspects of the issues, with a particular focus on foundational considerations, assessment factors and issues, and professional concerns in Atkins assessments.

Hall v Florida SCOTUS transcript from today

Here is today's transcript for the oral arguements and questioning before the US Supreme Court (SCOTUS) re the Hall v Florida Atkins case. To someone who has worked his entire career in intelligence testing, it is very interesting to hear the justices talk about IQ, SEM, etc.

Amicus briefs from APA and AAIDD (and others) have been posted previously at this blog. Prior decisions regarding Hall v Florida are available in the blogroll under Atkins decisions

 

Posted with Blogsy

The Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability: AAIDD forthcoming book publication--TOC with authors and chapter titles

    

 The Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability: A Guide (1/3/14)*

* Note the above title is as registered by AAIDD with Library of Congress and as presentedon their website. The working title of the task force had been:  Determining Intellectual Disability in the Courts: Focus on Capital Cases

 

As described at the AAIDD publications page:

 In the 2002 landmark decision Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that executing a person with intellectual disability is a violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment,” but left states to determine their own criteria for intellectual disability. AAIDD has always advocated against the death penalty for people with intellectual disability and has long provided amicus curiae briefs in Supreme Court cases. Thus, in this comprehensive new book published by AAIDD, notable authors in the field of intellectual disability discuss all aspects of the issues, with a particular focus on foundational considerations, assessment factors and issues, and professional concerns in Atkins assessments. 

                     

Chapter	Titles	Authors
	Preface	Ed Polloway
	Foreword	Honorable Kevin Foley
	Part 1:  Foundational Considerations
1	Guide for Persons with Intellectual Disability and Capital Cases: An Introduction	Edward A. Polloway James R. Patton J. David Smith
2	Intellectual Disability:  A Review of its Definitions and Diagnostic Criteria	Marc J. Tassé
3	Mild Intellectual Disability	Gary Siperstein Melissa Collins
4	Analysis of Atkins Cases	John Blume Karen Salekin
	Part 2:  Assessment Considerations
	A.  General Topics:
5	Concepts of Measurement	Keith Widaman
6	Age of Onset and the Developmental Period Criterion	Stephen Greenspan George Woods Harvey Switzky
	B. Intellectual Functioning:
7	Intellectual Functioning: Conceptual Issues	Kevin McGrew
8	Consideration in the Selection and Analysis of IQ Tests	Dale Watson
9	Variability of IQ scores	Stephen Greenspan J. Gregory Olley
10	Norm Obsolescence: The Flynn Effect	Kevin McGrew
	C. Adaptive Behavior:
11	Evolving Concepts of Adaptive Behavior	Stephen Greenspan
12	Selection of Appropriate Adaptive Behavior Instruments	J. Gregory Olley
13	Challenges in Assessment of Adaptive Behavior in Capital Cases	Caroline Everington Gilbert S. Macvaugh III Karen Salekin Timothy J. Derning
14	Time at Which Disability Must Be Shown in Atkins Cases	J. Gregory Olley
15	Briseño Factors	Stephen Greenspan
	Part 3:  Related Topics
16	Cultural Factors in Assessment	Richard Ruth
17	Assessment Issues: Competence to Waive Miranda Rights and Competence to Stand Trial	Karen Salekin Caroline Everington
18	Considerations of Retrospective Assessment and Malingering	Denis Keyes David Freedman
19	Intellectual Disability, Comorbid Disorders and Differential Diagnosis	George Woods David Freedman Timothy J. Derning
20	School and Other Key Records	James Patton
21	Relevance of Other Assessments in Atkins Evaluations	Karen Salekin Gilbert S. Macvaugh III Timothy J. Derning
22	Professional Issues in Atkins Assessments	Gilbert S. Macvaugh III Mark D. Cunningham Marc J. Tassé