Important article for CHC g, broad, narrow cognitive ability and achievement research.
Specific cognitive abilities: A discussion of advantages and disadvantages of measurement methods - ScienceDirect
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0160289626000425
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0160289626000425
Introduction
Over the past five decades, there has been a resurgence of interest in the study of cognitive abilities, particularly in relation to Spearman's two-factor theory of intelligence and factor analytic models of cognitive structure. In his seminal work, Spearman (1904) using the tetrad differences method, factor-analyzed data from schoolchildren and identified a common source of variance underlying performance across diverse cognitive tasks, which he termed the general factor, or g. The empirical observation that cognitive tests tend to correlate positively—a phenomenon known as positive manifold—has been consistently cited as evidence for the existence of g, a finding further supported by hierarchical and bifactor factor analytic approaches (e.g., Jensen, 1998). Several studies have addressed methodological approaches to measuring g (e.g., Jensen & Weng, 1994; Ree & Earles, 1991; Reeve & Blacksmith, 2009). Each cognitive test also captures unique variance not attributable to g, creating specific factors, or s. Despite their theoretical importance, there is a notable paucity of research focused on the measurement of s, with the work of Coyle and Greiff (2021) and Kell and Lang, 2017, Kell and Lang, 2018 representing examples of the few contributions in this area. While specific variance is typically unique to individual measures, in cases where multiple tests share a common specific source of variance, the resulting construct is classified as a group factor.
Whereas g represents broad, generalized cognitive functioning, specific abilities denote more narrowly defined cognitive abilities. These specific abilities are typically assessed using cognitive tests or tasks that measure both g and specific abilities. Specific abilities are rarely measured without also measuring general cognitive ability.
Specific abilities can be thought of as a continuum going from narrow versus broader factors. A good example is a broad spatial factor (spatial working memory, mental rotation, spatial reasoning) versus a narrowly defined spatial factor focusing on just visualization.
Thomson (1916) proposed an ability sampling model (also called the bonds model) of cognitive ability as an alternative to Spearman's two-factor theory. His model proposed that intelligence is related to the number and complexity of neural patterns in the brain rather than the existence of a general factor. Analyzing the same data as Spearman, Thomson found no need for a general factor, instead proposing that test scores are the sum of specific factors only. Thomson proposed that intelligence is not the consequence of a single pervasive factor. Rather, it emerges from the sampling of multiple independent mental elements, which he called “bonds.” The theory posits that the human brain learns to associate various bonds. The bonds are described very abstractly, so it is unclear what they correspond to psychologically or neurologically (e.g., cognitive processes, connections, skills, etc.). Because the model is cast mainly as a statistical sampling scheme, critics have argued that it is not a worked-out theory of cognitive architecture, but more a how-you-could-get-the-correlations story (Thomson, 1916). Bartholomew et al. (2009) contend that Thomson's model deserves more consideration. They argue that modern factor analysis cannot distinguish between Spearman's and Tomson's models; that is, they are mathematically equivalent in terms of fit to the data.
Tredoux (2025) contends that there is a lack of substantive evidence for Thomson's model and that it relies heavily on probabilistic reasoning and arguments based on chance. Tredoux further notes that Thomas' model serves as a method to illustrate cognitive functioning rather than how the mind actually works.
There are some competing process models of human ability. For example, the construct “working memory” has been proposed as a central organizing system for learning and action (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Miller et al., 1960).
A range of cognitive processes has been proposed to account for the observed relationships, including processing speed, executive functioning, levels of processing theory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), and the Cattell-Horn-Carrol (CHC) three-stratum theory of intelligence (Carroll, 1996). These perspectives have also been discussed in relation to Spearman's contribution to theories of human abilities (see Dennis & Tapsfield, 1996).
The model selected by a researcher to represent general and specific cognitive abilities carries significant implications for the interpretation of cognitive structure. To properly interpret the results of a cognitive structure factor analysis, it is essential to remove the variance attributable to general cognitive ability (g) from specific (s) factors and ensure that they are orthogonal to one another. Without orthogonality, the analysis cannot effectively distinguish whether the variance is predominantly associated with g or with specific cognitive abilities. For example, hierarchical factor analysis may implicitly support the view that specific abilities are subsumed under g due to the inherent dependence structure of the model.
In contrast, bifactor models propose that all observed indicators (e.g., test scores) are directly influenced by a general factor (g), while specific factors (s) directly influence only a subset of indicators. Importantly, these specific factors are orthogonal both to g and to each other, thus precluding any assumptions regarding their origin or causal relationship to g.
Despite their mathematical distinction, unrotated principal components analysis and unrotated principal factors analysis yield orthogonal components or orthogonal factors and do not allow attributing causal origins. Consequently, differences in analytical approaches can lead to divergent theoretical interpretations of cognitive structure, particularly regarding the nature and independence of specific abilities.
There are several reasons for assessing specific cognitive abilities. Notable among them is the need to evaluate whether one or more of the specific abilities provide incremental predictive validity beyond general cognitive ability for important outcomes such as educational attainment, training success, career success, or job performance. Furthermore, the development and refinement of theoretical models of the structural organization of cognitive abilities or the possible origins of specific abilities necessitate precise measurement and empirical evaluation. The validity of conclusions drawn from such investigations depends both upon the appropriateness of the model and the reliability of the measures used. The accurate measurement of specific abilities facilitates the construction of detailed cognitive compendia, which are essential for theory development, individualized educational planning, and development of personnel measurement and selection instruments. There is no guarantee that tests or cognitive tasks created by researchers are isomorphic with brain structure and function. External tasks do not necessarily reveal internal brain structures and processes (Ree et al., 2024).
The purpose of this article is to present a critical analysis of key considerations in the assessment of specific abilities. The article presents six distinct approaches to defining specific abilities, followed by an analysis of the strengths and limitations of each. The discussion concludes with an evaluation of the implications these approaches have for both theoretical model development and applied practice. The approaches examined include: (a) Spearman's (1904) model, (b) face validity, (c) the use of unrotated factors and unrotated components (Hotelling, 1936), (d) hierarchical factor analysis (Holzinger & Swineford, 1937), (e) orthogonalized hierarchical factor analysis (Schmid & Leiman, 1957), and (f) bifactor analysis (Holzinger & Harman, 1938; Holzinger & Swineford, 1937; Mansolf & Reise, 2016).
Pardon typos and spelling errors-Message may be sent from iPhone and I've always had spelling problems :)
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Kevin S. McGrew, PhD
Educational & School Psychologist
Director
Institute for Applied Psychometrics (IAP)
https://www.themindhub.com
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Kevin S. McGrew, PhD
Educational & School Psychologist
Director
Institute for Applied Psychometrics (IAP)
https://www.themindhub.com
******************************************